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REPRESENTING ACTION AND CHANGE BY 
LOGIC PROGRAMS 
MICHAEL GELFOND AND VLADIMIR LIFSCHITZ” 
D We represent properties of actions in a logic programming language that 
uses both classical negation and negation as failure. The method is 
applicable to temporal projection problems with incomplete information, 
as well as to reasoning about the past. It is proved to be sound relative to a 
semantics of action based on states and transition functions. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper extends the work of Eshghi and Kowalski [61, Evans [7], and Apt and 
Bezem [l] on representing properties of actions in logic programming languages 
with negation as failure. 
Our goal is to overcome some of the limitations of the earlier work. The existing 
formalizations of action in logic programming are adequate for only the simplest 
kind of temporal reasoning-“temporal projection.” In a temporal projection 
problem, we are given a description of the initial state of the world, and we use 
properties of actions to determine what the world will look like after a series of 
actions is performed. Moreover, the existing formalizations can be used for 
temporal projection only in the cases when the given description of the initial state 
is complete. The reason for that is that these formalizations use the semantics of 
logic programming which automatically apply the “closed world assumption” to 
each predicate. 
We are interested here in temporal reasoning of a more general kind, when the 
values of some fluents’ in one or more situations are given and the goal is to derive 
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other facts about the values of fluents. Besides temporal projection, this class of 
reasoning problems includes, for instance, the cases when we want to use informa- 
tion about the current state of the world for answering questions about the past.’ 
The view of logic programming accepted in this paper is strictly declarative. The 
adequacy of a representation of a body of knowledge in a logic programming 
language means, to us, adequacy with respect to the declarative semantics of that 
language. In fact, the language of “extended logic programs” used in this paper is a 
subset of the system of default logic from [30], and our work can be viewed as a 
development of the approach to temporal reasoning based on nonnormal defaults 
[25]. The possibility of using the logic programs proposed in this paper for the 
automation of temporal reasoning, based on program transformations and the 
XOLDTNF metainterpreter [4], is demonstrated in the forthcoming paper [20]. 
Two parts of this paper may be of more general interest. 
First, we introduce here a simple declarative language for describing actions, 
called &. Traditionally, ideas on representing properties of actions in classical ogic 
or nonmonotonic formalisms are explained on specific examples, such as the “Yale 
shooting problem” from [14]. Competing approaches are evaluated and compared 
in terms of their ability to handle such examples. We propose to supplement he 
use of examples by a different method. A particular methodology for representing 
action can be formally described as a translation from ti, or from a subset or a 
superset of M, into a “target language”-for instance, into a language based on 
classical ogic or on circumscription, or into a logic programming language. 
Our method for describing properties of actions in logic programming is 
presented here as a translation from & into the language of extended logic 
programs, and its soundness is the main technical result of the paper. A counterex- 
ample is given showing that the translation is incomplete. A possible way of 
achieving completeness is discussed in the last section. 
Second, the proof of the main theorem depends on a relationship between 
stable models [ill and signings [18] that may be interesting as a part of the general 
theory of logic programming. 
The language & is introduced in Section 2, and Section 3 is a brief review of 
extended logic programs. Our translation from M into logic programming is 
defined in Section 4, and the soundness theorem is stated in Section 5. Section 6 
contains the lemmas that relate stable models to signings, and in Section 7 the 
proof of the soundness theorem is presented. 
2. A LANGUAGE FOR DESCRIBING ACTIONS 
A description of an action domain in the language & consists of “propositions” of 
two kinds. A “value proposition” specifies the value of a fluent in a particular 
situation-either in the initial situation or after performing a sequence of actions. 
An “effect proposition” describes the effect of an action on a fluent. 
We begin with two disjoint nonempty sets of symbols, called fluent names and 
action names. A fluent expression is a fluent name possibly preceded by 7. A value 
* One possible way to represent reasoning about the past is to treat it as fundamentally different 
from temporal projection and to interpret it as “explanation” and “abduction” [33]. Our approach is 
more symmetric; we treat both forms of reasoning as deductive. 
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proposition is an expression of the form 
FafterA,;...;A,, (1) 
where F is a fluent expression, and A,, . . . , A, (m 2 0) are action names. If m = 0, 
we will write (1) as 
initially F. 
An effect proposition is an expression of the form 
A causes F if PI,...,P,, (2) 
where A is an action name, and each of F, P,, . . . , P,, (n 2 0) is a fluent expression. 
About this proposition we say that it describes the effect of A on F, and that 
P 1,. . . , P, are its preconditions. If n = 0, we will drop if and write simply 
A causes F. 
A proposition is a value proposition or an effect proposition. A domain 
description, or simply domain, is a set of propositions (not necessarily finite). 
Example 1. The Fragile Object domain, motivated by an example from [321, has 
the fluent names Holding, Fragile and Broken, and the action Drop. It consists of 
two effect propositions: 
Drop causes7 Holding if Holding, 
Drop causes Broken if Holding, Fragile. 
Example 2. The Yale Shooting domain, motivated by the example from [141 
mentioned above, is defined as follows. The fluent names are Loaded and Alive; 
the action names are Loud, Shoot, and Wait. The domain is characterized by the 
propositions 
initially 7 Loaded, 
initially Alive, 
Load causes Loaded, 
Shoot causes7 Alive if Loaded, 
Shoot causes -Y Loaded. 
Example 3. The Murder Mystery domain, motivated by an example from [2], is 
obtained from the Yale Shooting domain by substituting 
7 Alive after Shoot; Wait (3) 
for the proposition initially -T Loaded. 
Example 4. The Stolen Car domain, motivated by an example from [161, has one 
fluent name Stolen and one action name Wait, and is characterized by two 
propositions: 
initially 7 Stolen, 
Stolen after Wait; Wait; Wait. 
To describe the semantics of &, we will define what the “models” of a domain 
description are and when a value proposition is “entailed” by a domain description. 
304 M. GELFOND AND V. LIFSCHITZ 
A state is a set of fluent names. Given a fluent name F and a state u, we say 
that F holds in u if F E u ; 7 F holds in u if F CZ cr. A transition function is a 
mapping Cp of the set of pairs (A, ~1, where A is an action name and (+ is a state, 
into the set of states. A structure is a pair ((+a,@), where a,, is a state (the initial 
state of the structure) and @ is a transition function. 
For any structure M and any action names A,, . . . , A,,,, by MA,;...; Am we denote 
the state 
where @ is the transition function of M, and o0 is the initial state of M. We say 
that a value proposition (1) is true in a structure M if F holds in the state 
MA,;...;A, and that it is false otherwise. In particular, a proposition of the form 
initially F’is true in M iff F holds in the initial state of M. 
A structure (aO, @) is a model of a domain description D if every value 
proposition from D is true in (a,, @) and, for every action name A, every fluent 
name F, and every state u, the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i) If D includes an effect proposition describing the effect of A on F whose 
preconditions hold in u, then F E a( A, u ). 
(ii) If D includes an effect proposition describing the effect of A on --, F 
whose preconditions hold in u, then F E @(A, u 1. 
(iii) If D does not include such effect propositions, then F E @(A, a) iff F E u. 
It is clear that there can be at most one transition function @J satisfying 
conditions (i>-(iii). Consequently, different models of the same domain description 
can differ only by their initial states. For instance, the Fragile Object domain 
(Example 1) has eight models, whose initial states are the subsets of 
{ Holding, Fragile, Broken} ; 
in each model, the transition function is defined by the equation 
@(Drop, a) = 
a\ {Holding} U {Broken} , if Holding, Fragile E u , 
a\ { Holding} , otherwise. 
A domain description is consistent if it has a model, and complete if it has 
exactly one model. The Fragile Object domain is consistent, but incomplete. The 
Yale Shooting domain (Example 2) is complete; its only model is defined by the 
equations 
a, = ( Alive), 
@ ( Load, u ) = u U { Loaded] , 
cp(Shoot, a) = 
CT\ {Loaded, Alive}, if Loaded E u , 
U, otherwise, 
Q(Wait,u) = a. 
The Murder Mystery domain (Example 3) is complete also; it has the same 
transition function as Yale Shooting, and the initial state {Loaded, Alive}. The 
Stolen Car domain (Example 4) is inconsistent. 
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A value proposition is entailed by a domain description D if it is true in every 
model of D. For instance, Yale Shooting entails 
7 Alive after Load; Wait; Shoot. 
Murder Mystery entails, among others, the propositions 
initially Loaded 
and 
-J Alive after Wait; Shoot. 
Note that the last proposition differs from (3) by the order in which the two actions 
are executed. This example illustrates the possibility of reasoning about alternative 
“possible futures” of the initial situation. 
The language L/ is adequate for formalizing several interesting domains. Note 
that the domains from Examples 1-3, although very simple, have been actually 
proposed in the literature as counterexamples demonstrating the inadequacy and 
limitations of some earlier approaches to formalizing action. In many respects, 
however, the expressive power of _u’ is rather limited. Some ways of extending ~2 
are mentioned in Section 8. 
The entailment relation of & is nonmonotonic, in the sense that adding an 
effect proposition to a domain description D may nonmonotonically change the set 
of propositions entailed by D. (This cannot happen when a value proposition is 
added.) For this reason, a modular translation from LZZ into another declarative 
language (that is, a translation that processes propositions one by one) can be 
reasonably adequate only if this other language is nonmonotonic also. 
3. EXTENDED LOGIC PROGRAMS 
Representing incomplete information in traditional logic programming languages is 
difficult. Given a ground query, a traditional two-valued logic programming system 
can produce only one of two answers, yes or no; it will never tell us that the truth 
value of the query cannot be determined on the basis of the information included 
in the program. 
Extended logic programs (introduced in [12]), are, in this sense, different. The 
language of extended programs distinguishes between negation as failure not and 
classical negation 7. The expression 7 A, where A is an atom, means, intuitively, 
“A is false”; the expression not A is interpreted as “there is no evidence that A is 
true.” There is a clear difference between these two assertions if the program gives 
no information about the truth value of A. 
The general form of an extended rule is 
L,+L ,,..., L,,notL,+ ,,..., notL,, (4) 
where each Li is a literal, that is, an atom possibly preceded by 7. 
An extended program is a set of such rules. Here is an example: 
P, 
7qtP, 
r+- TP, 
t+- 7q,nots, 
u+not 7u. 
(5) 
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Intuitively, these rules say: 
p is true; 
q is false if p is true; 
r is true if p is false; 
t is true if q is false and there is no evidence that s is true; 
u is true if there is no evidence that it is false. 
The answers that an implementation of this language is supposed to give to the 
ground queries are 
p: yes, 
q: no, 
r: unknown, 
s: unknown, 
t: yes, 
u: yes. 
The semantics of extended logic programs defines when a set of ground literals 
is an answer set of a program [El. A rule with variables is treated as shorthand for 
the set of its ground instances. For extended programs without variables, answer 
sets are defined in two steps. 
First, let II be an extended program without variables that doesn’t contain not. 
The answer set of II is the smallest set S of ground literals such that 
(i> for any rule L, + L,, . . . , L, from II, if L,, . . . , L, E S, then L, E S; 
(ii) if S contains a pair of complementary literals, then S is the set of all ground 
literals. 
Now let II be any extended program without variables. For any set S of ground 
literals, let IIS be the extended program obtained from II by deleting the 
following: 
(i) each rule that has an expression not L in its body with L E S; 
(ii) all expressions of the form not L in the bodies of the remaining rules. 
Clearly, II’ doesn’t contain not, so that its answer set is already defined. If this 
answer set coincides with S, then we say that S is an answer set of II. 
It is easy to check, for instance, that the program (5) has one answer set, 
{p, 1q,t, u1. 
The answer sets of a program can be easily characterized in terms of default 
logic. We will identify the rule (4) with the default 
L1 A -0. ALm:Lm+l,...,L,/Lo (6) 
(z stands for the literal complementary to L). Thus every extended program can 
be viewed as a default theory. The answer sets of a program are simply its 
extensions in the sense of default logic, intersected with the set of ground literals 
([ 121, Proposition 3). 
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Two other approaches to the semantics of logic programs with two kinds of 
negation are proposed in [29] and [28]. In the context of this paper, they can be 
shown to lead to the same result as the answer set semantics. 
4. DESCRIBING ACTIONS BY LOGIC PROGRAMS 
Now we are ready to define the translation rr from JY into the language of 
extended programs. 
About two different effect propositions we say that they are similar if they differ 
only by their preconditions. Our translation method is defined for any domain 
description that does not contain similar effect propositions. This condition pro- 
hibits, for instance, combining in the same domain such propositions as 
Shoot causes 1 Alive if Loaded, 
Shoot causes7 Alive if VeryNervous. 
(VeryNervous refers to the victim, of course-not to the gun.) 
Let D be a domain description without similar effect propositions. The corre- 
sponding logic program TTD uses variables of three sorts: situation variables 
s, s’, . . . , fluent variables f, f’, . . . , and action variables a, (I’, . . . .3 Its only situation 
constants is SO; its fluent constants and action constants are, respectively, the 
fluent names and action names of D. There are also some predicate and function 
symbols; the sorts of their arguments and values will be clear from their use in the 
rules below. 
The program TTD will consist of the translations of the individual propositions 
from D and the four standard rules: 
Holds( f, Result( a, s)) +- Holds( f, s) , not Noninetiial( f, a, s) , 
7 Holds( f, Result( a, s)) * -T Holds( f, s) , not Noninertiul( f, a, s) , 
(7) 
Holds( f, s) + Holds( f, ResuZt ( a, s)) , not Noninertial( f, a, s) , 
(8) 
7 Holds(f,s) +- 7 HoZds( f, Rem&( a, s) ) , not Noninetiial( f, a, s) . 
These rules are motivated by the “commonsense law of inertia,” according to 
which the value of a fluent after performing an action is normally the same as 
before. The rules (7) allow us to apply the law of inertia in reasoning “from the 
past to the future”: the first, when a fluent is known to be true in the past; the 
second, when it is known to be false. The rules (8) play the same role for reasoning 
“from the future to the past.” The auxiliary predicate Noninertial is essentially an 
“abnormality predicate” [22]. 
Now we will define how rr translates value propositions and effect propositions. 
The following notation will be useful: For any fluent name F, 
jF\is F,l-~Flis F, 
and, if t is a situation term, HoZds( 7 F, t) stands for -, Holds(F, t). The last 
convention allows us to write HoZds(F, t) even when F is a fluent name preceded 
3 Using a sorted language implies, first of all, that all atoms in the rules of the program are formed 
in accordance with the syntax of sorted predicate logic. Moreover, when we speak of an insfunce of a 
rule, it will be always assumed that the terms substituted for variables are of appropriate sorts. 
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by 7. Furthermore, if A,, . . . , A, are action names, [A,; . . . . A,] stands for the 
term 
ResuZts(A,,ResuZt(A,_,,...,ResuZt(A,,SO)...)). 
It is clear that every situation term without variables can be represented in this 
form. 
The translation of a value proposition (1) is 
HoZds(F,[A,;...;A,]). 
For instance, dinitially Aliue) is 
HOZdS( Ali&?, SO)) 
and rr( 7 Alive after Shoot) is 
(9) 
-Y HoZds( Alive, ResuZt( Shoot, SO)). 
The translation of an effect proposition (2) consists of 2n + 2 rules. The first of 
them is 
HoZds(F,ResuZt(A,s)) ~HoZds(P,,s),...,HoZds(P,,s). (10) 
It allows us to prove that F will hold after A, if the preconditions are satisfied. The 
second rule is 
NoninertiuZ(IFI,A,s) +-notHoZds(P,,s),...,notHoZds(P,,s) (11) 
[HoZds( Pi, s) is the literal complementary to HoZds(Pi, ~1.1 It disables the inertia 
rules (7) and (8) in the cases when f can be affected by a. Without this rule, the 
program would be contradictory: We would prove, using a rule of the form (lo), 
that an unloaded gun becomes loaded after the action Loud, and also, using the 
second of the rules (71, that it remains unloaded! 
Note the use of not in (11). We want to disable the inertia rules not only when 
the preconditions for the change in the value of F are known to hold, but 
whenever there is no evidence that they do not hold. If, for instance, we do not know 
whether Loaded currently holds, then we do not want to conclude by inertia that 
the value of Alive will remain the same after Shoot. We cannot draw any 
conclusions about the new value of Aliue. If we replaced the body of (11) by 
Hold&‘,, s), . . . , HoZds(P,, s), the translation would become unsound. 
Besides (101 and (111, the translation of (2) contains, for each i (1 s i c n>, the 
rules 
HoZds( Pi, s) + HoZds( F, s), HoZds( F, ResuZt( A, s)) 
and 
(12) 
HoZds(Pi,s) +HoZds(F,ResuZt(A,s)), 
HoZds(P,,s) ,..., HoZds(f’_,,s), 
HoZds(P,+l,s) ,..., HoZds(P,,s). 
(13) 
The rules (12) justify the following form of reasoning: If the value of F has 
changed after performing A, then we can conclude that the preconditions were 
satisfied when A was performed. These rules would be unsound in the presence of 
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similar propositions. The rules (13) allow us to conclude that a precondition was 
false from the fact that performing an action did not lead to the result described by 
an effect axiom, while all other preconditions were true. 
We will illustrate the translation process by applying it to Yale Shooting 
(Example 2). Th e t ranslation of that domain includes, in addition to (7) and (8), the 
following rules: 
Yl. 7 Holds( Loaded, SO>. 
Y2. Holds(Alive, SO). 
Y3. Holds(Loaded, Result(Load, s)). 
Y4. Noninetiial( Loaded, Load, s). 
Y5. 7 Holds(Alive, Result(Shoot, s)) +- Holds(Loaded, s). 
Y6. Noninertial( Alive, Shoot, s> + not 7 Holds( Loaded, s). 
Y 7. Holds( Loaded, s) + Holds( Alive, s>, 7 Holds( Alive, Result(Shoot, s)). 
Y8. 7 Holds( Loaded, s) + Holds( Alive, Result(Shoot, s>>. 
Y9. T Holds(Loaded, Result(Shoot, s)). 
Y 10. Noninetiial(Loaded, Shoot, s). 
It is instructive to compare this set of rules with the formalization of Yale 
Shooting given by Apt and Bezem [l], who were only interested in temporal 
projection problems and did not use classical negation. Instead of our four inertia 
rules, they have one, corresponding to the first of the rules (7). In addition, their 
program includes counterparts of Y2, Y3, Y5, and Y6. It does not tell us whether 
Loaded holds in the initial situation, but the negative answer to this question 
follows by the closed world assumption. Their rule corresponding to Y5 does not 
have 7 in the head, of course; instead, the new fluent Dead is used. In their 
counterpart of Y6, the combination not 7 is missing; this does not lead to any 
difficulties, because the closed world assumption is implicitly postulated. 
5. SOUNDNESS THEOREM 
We say that a ground literal L is entailed by an extended logic program if it 
belongs to all its answer sets (or, equivalently, to all its extensions in the sense of 
default logic). Using this notion of entailment and the entailment relation for the 
language & introduced in Section 2, we can state a result expressing the soundness 
of the translation G-. 
Soundness Theorem. Let D be a domain description without similar effect propositions. 
For any value proposition P, if rrD entails 7zP, then D entails P. 
For an inconsistent D, the statement of the soundness theorem is trivial, 
because such D entails every value proposition. For consistent domain descrip- 
tions, the statement of the theorem is an immediate consequence of the following 
lemma, which will be proved in Section 7: 
Soundness Lemma. Let D be a consistent domain description without similar effect 
propositions. There exists an answer set Z of ITD such that, for any value 
proposition P, if WP E Z, then D entails P. 
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Note that the lemma asserts the possibility of selecting Z uniformly for all P; 
this is more than is required for the soundness theorem. 
The set Z from the statement of the lemma is obviously consistent, because a 
consistent domain description cannot entail two complementary value propositions. 
Consequently, if D is consistent and does not include similar value propositions, 
then TD has a consistent answer set. 
The converse of the soundness theorem does not hold, so that the translation r 
is incomplete. This following simple counterexample belongs to Thomas Woo 
(personal communication). Let D be the domain with one fluent name F and one 
action name A, characterized by two propositions: 
F after A, 
A causes F if F. 
It is clear that D entails initially F, but the translation of this proposition, 
Holds(F, SO), is not entailed by TD. Indeed, it is easy to verify that the set of all 
positive ground literals other than Holds(F, SO> is an answer set of TD. 
6. ANSWER SETS AND SIGNINGS 
To prove the soundness lemma, we need the following definition. Let II be a 
general logic program (that is, an extended program that does not contain classical 
negation). A s&zing for II is any set S of ground atoms such that, for any ground 
instance 
B,+B, ,..., B,,notB,+, ,..., notB, 
of any rule from II, either 
B,,B, ,..., B,ES, B,+l ,..., B,PS 
or 
B,,B, ,..., B,ES, B,+l ,..., B,cK4 
For example, {p} is a signing for the program 
P +not97 9 + notp, r-+-q. 
In this section we show that the answer sets of a general program II which has a 
signing S can be characterized in terms of the fixpoints of a monotone operator. 
Specifically, for any set X of ground atoms, let 8X be the symmetric difference of 
X and S: 
0x= (X\S) u (S\X). 
Obviously, 8 is one-to-one. Moreover, it is clear that 0 is an involution: 
02X= {KX\S) ” (S\X)l \q ” P\Knv ” (ww 
=(X\S)u(SnX) 
=x. 
4 This is slightly different from the original definition [18]. 
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We will define a monotone operator 4 such that any X is an answer set of II if 
and only if 8X is a fixpoint of 4. 
Recall that, for general logic programs, the notion of answer set (or “stable 
model”) can be defined by means of the following construction [ll]. Let II be a 
general logic program, with every rule replaced by all its ground instances. The 
reduct IIx of II relative to a set X of ground atoms is obtained from II by 
deleting the following: 
6) each rule that has an expression of the form not B in its body with B EX; 
(ii) all expressions of the form not B in the bodies of the remaining rules. 
Clearly, IIx is a positive program, and we can consider its “minimal model”-the 
smallest set of ground atoms closed under its rules. If this set coincides with X, 
then X is an answer set of lI. 
This condition can be expressed by the equation X = crIIx, where. (Y is the 
operator that maps any positive program to its minimal model. 
Let S be a signing for II. The operator $ is defined by the equation 
Lemma 1. A set X of ground atoms is an answer set of KI iff 0X is a &point of 4. 
PROOF. By the-definition of 4, 8X is a fixpoint of 4 iff 
&2II@* = 0x. 
Since 0 is one-to-one and an involution, this is equivalent to 
cuII”=x. n 
Note that, since 8 is an involution, Lemma 1 can be also stated as follows: X is 
an answer set of II iff X= 0Y for some tixpoint Y of 4. 
Lemma 2. The operator qb is monotone. 
PROOF. Let III, be the set of all rules from II whose heads belong to S, and let II2 
be the set of all remaining rules. Clearly, for any X, 
I-I”=II;“uIII,X. 
Since S is a signing for II, all atoms occurring in IIT belong to S, and all atoms 
occurring in IIf belong to the complement of S. Consequently, II; and IIf are 
disjoint, and 
aIIx= (IIIIIpu an;. 
Furthermore, for any expression of the form not B occurring in II,, B does not 
belong to S; consequently, 
II* = IIx\s 
1 1 . 
Similarly, for any expression of the form not B occurring in II,, B belongs to S, so 
that 
Consequently, for every X, 
aIIX= (YIIF’S u aII,x”S. 
In particular, 
anox= (yII,Bx\s (J ,@X”S* 
It is clear from the definition of 
ex\s=x\s, 
exns=s\x. 
We conclude that 
an@X = &IIx\s u (yIIs\x 
1 2 * 
M. GELFOND AND V. LIFSCHITZ 
8 that 
By the choice of II, and 112, aIIf\s is contained in S, and cyIIilx is disjoint 
with S. Consequently, 
aHex \ 27 S = (yBS\X 
S\arIox=S\dInr(‘S. 
Hence 
4x=e0-rPx= (ansx\S)u(S\anex)=an~'xu(s\~~;""). 
Since (Y is monotone and the reduct operators X * IIF are antimonotone, it 
follows that 4 is monotone. n 
Having proved Lemmas 1 and 2, we can use properties of the fixpoints of 
monotone operators given by the Knaster-Tarski theorem [34] to study the answer 
sets of a program with a signing. The Knaster-Tarski theorem asserts, for instance, 
that every monotone operator has a fixpoint; this gives a new, and more direct, 
proof of the fact that every general program with a signing has at least one answer 
set.5 Moreover, it asserts that a monotone operator has a least lixpoint, which is 
also its least pre-fixpoint. (A pre-Jixpoint of 4 is any set X such that $X cX.> This 
characterization of the least fixpoint of 4 is used in the proof of the soundness 
lemma below. 
7. PROOF OF THE SOUNDNESS LEMMA 
The results of the previous section are not directly applicable to programs with 
classical negation. It is known, however, that any extended program II can be 
converted into a closely related program without classical negation, as follows [12]. 
For each predicate P occurring in II, select a new predicate P’ of the same arity. 
The atom P’( a-. > is the positive form of the negative literal 7 P( -*a ); every 
positive literal is, by definition, its own positive form. The positive form of a literal 
L is denoted by Lf. For any set X of literals, X+ stands for the set of the positive 
forms of the elements of X. For any program II, its positive form is the program 
5 The existence of answer sets for such programs, and for programs of some more general types, was 
established by Phan Minh Dung [S] and Fraqois Fages [8]. 
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obtained from ll by replacing each rule (4) by 
L,+ +L: )...) L;,notL;+, )...) nott;. 
According to Proposition 2 from [12], a consistent set X of ground literals is an 
answer set of Il if and only if X+ is an answer set of the positive form of II. 
In particular, the positive form of TD has three predicate symbols: Holds, 
Holds’, and Noninertial. (There is no Noninertial’, because the predicate Noninertial 
does not occur in rrD under 7 .) Its rules are obtained from the rules of rD by 
substituting HoZds’ for 7 Holds. For instance, the inertia rules (7) and (8) become 
Holds( f, Result( a, s)) + Hofds( f, s) , not Noninertial( f, a, s) , 
(14) 
Holds’( f, Result( a, s)) + HoZds’( f, s), not Noninertiaf( f, a, s), 
Holds( f, s) +- Holds( f, Result ( a, s) ) , not Noninetiial( f, a, s) , 
(15) 
HoZds’( f, s) +- Holds’( f, Result( a, s)) , not Noninetiial( f, a, s) . 
The rules (11) turn into 
Noninertial(IFI,A,s) +notHofds(P,,s)+,...,notHoZds(P,,s)+. (16) 
[The predicate symbol in the atom Holds( Pk, s) + is either Holds or Holds’, 
depending on whether or not Pk includes a negation sign.] 
In the rest of this section, D is a consistent domain description such that every 
two similar value propositions from D are disjoint, and II stands for the positive 
form of TD. 
Let S be the set of all ground atoms that contain the predicate symbol 
Noninertial. It is easy to see that S is a signing for Il. By 0 and 4 we denote the 
operators defined, for these Il and S, as in the previous section. 
Recall that our goal is to find an answer set 2 of rD such that, for any value 
proposition P, if rrP E Z, then D entails P. This set Z will be defined by the 
condition Z+ = r3Y, where Y is the least fixpoint of 4. It is easy to understand why 
this is a reasonable choice. Lemma 1 tells us that 8Y is an answer set of Il; it 
follows that Z is indeed an answer set of TD (provided that it is consistent). On 
the other hand, since Y is the least fixpoint of c,!J, BY includes “few” atoms 
beginning with HoZds or Holds’ (it is clear that such an atom belongs to 0Y iff it 
belongs to Y). For this reason, Z includes “few” literals with the predicate symbol 
Holds, which makes the assumption rrP E Z in the statement of the soundness 
lemma particularly strong. 
For any model M of D, let h(M) stand for the set of atoms of the form (S-P)‘, 
where P is a value proposition that is true in M. It is clear that the predicate 
symbols in these atoms are Holds and Holds’. By n(M) we denote the set of atoms 
of the form NoninetiiaKF, A, [A,; . . . ; A,]), where F is a fluent name and 
A,A ,, . . . , A,,, are action names, such that the value propositions 
F after A,;...; A,, 
F after A,;...; A,; A 
(17) 
are either both true in M or both false in M. Finally, define 
X,=/z(M) Un(M). 
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Note that X,\S =/z(M) and S\X,,, = S\n(M), so that 
ex, =h(M) u (S\n(M)). 
Our goal is to show that X,,, is a pre-fixpoint of 4, that is, 
4X, CXM 
(18) 
(Lemma 5 below). To this end, we will check that X, contains both 4X, n S and 
4XM\S. 
Lemma 3. For any model M of D, 4X,,., rl S c X,,, . 
PROOF. Assume th$ B E 4X, n S. Then B E S, which means that B has the+form 
Noninertial(F, A, [A]) where F is a fluent name, A is an action name, and A is a 
tuple A,;. . . ; A, of action names. Assume that B EX,. Then B @n(M), so that 
one of the atoms (17) is true in M, and the other false. This can be also expressed 
by saying that F holds in exactly one of the two states 
where @ is the transition function of M. This is only possible if D includes an 
effect proposition describing the effect of A on F or on 7 F, whose preconditions 
hold in MA. Consider the rule of the type (16) corresponding to this effect 
proposition: 
Noninertial(F,A,s) tnotHolds(P,,s)+,...,notHoZds(P,,s)+. 
The ground instance of this rule, obtained by substituting [a] for s, can be written 
as 
B cnot Holds P (+,...,notHolds(P,,[dl)+. A’ (19) 
Since all preconditions Pi hold in IM~~,...;~,, each of the value propositions 
Pi after 2 
is true in M. It follows that the atoms Holds Pi, A 
T--IT+ 
do not belong to h(M). By 
(18), we can conclude that they do not belong to 0X, either. Consequently, the 
reduct IIex, includes the rule obtained by removing all expressions 
not Holds Pi, A 
T----TT+ 
from (19), so that B E IIeX~, and hence B E LY IIeex~. Since B belongs also to S, it 
follows that 
B ~5 8aIIex~ = @X MY 
contrary to the assumption that B E c&X, fl S. n 
Lemma 4. For any model M of D, cx IIex, c h(M) U S. 
PROOF. It is sufficient to verify that h(M) U S is closed under all rules of II”“M. 
There are rules of two kinds in this program: those in which every atom belongs to 
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S, and those in which every atom belongs to the complement of S. Consequently, 
we need to check that S is closed under all rules of the first kind, and h(M) is 
closed under all rules of the second kind. The rules of the first kind are simply 
ground atoms beginning with Noninertial, so that the first claim is trivial. Let R be 
a rule of the second kind. It is obtained from an instance of the positive form of 
one of the rules of rD by deleting all expressions of the form not B from its body. 
Consider several cases, depending on the form of this rule of TD. 
Case 1. R is obtained from one of the rules (7) and (8). Then the positive form 
of this rule is one of the rules (14) and (1.5). The ground instances of these rules 
have the forms 
Holds(F, [A; A]) +- Holds(F, [ A]), not Noninetikzl(F, A, [Till, 
Hdds’(F, [ d; A]) +- Hdds’(F, [A]), not Noninertial(F, A, [ 211, 
Holds(F, [ 21) + Holds(F, [ 2; A]), not Noninertial(F, A, [ 211, 
Holds’(F, [d]) + Holds’(F, [ 2; A]), not Noninertial(F, A, [ 211, 
Where Pi is a tuple A,;...; A, of actions names. Consequently, R has one of the 
forms 
Holds(F, [ 2; A]) + Holds(F, [ii]), 
Holds’(F,[A; A]) + Holds’(F,[d]), 
Holds(F, [ 21) + HoZds(F, [A; A]), 
Holds’(F, [a]) + Holds’( F, [ 2; A]), 
that is, 
r(F after 2; A)++ r(F after d)+, 
T( T F after 2; A)+ +- T( -I F after d)+, 
r(F after A>‘+- r(F after A; A)+, 
(20) 
T( T F after d)+ + d -I F after 2; A)+. 
Moreover, NoninertiaKF, A, [ 21) G 0X,, because otherwise the rules would not be 
included in the reduct IIex,. Since 
Noninertiul(F, A, [ “1) ES, 
it follows that 
Noninertial(F,A,[~]) ES\OX,=SnX,=n(M). 
By the definition of n(M), this means that the the value propositions (17) are 
either both true in M or both false in M. It follows that if the body of one of the 
rules (20) belongs to h(M), then so does its head. 
Case 2. R is obtained from the translation of one of the value propositions P 
from D. Then R is (rP>‘. Since M is a model of D, P is true in M, and 
(rP>+~iz(M). 
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It remains to consider the cases when R is obtained from one of the rules (101, 
(12), and (131, corresponding to some effect proposition P from D. (The rules 
obtained from (11) belong to the first kind, discussed at the beginning of the proof.) 
By Cp we will denote the transition function of M. 
Case 3. R is obtained from (10). Then it has the form 
that is, 
7T(Fafter&4)++7r(P, afterA)+,...,5T(Pn aftera)+. (21) 
If all atoms in the body of (21) belong to h(M), then all preconditions P,, . . . , P,, 
hold in the state MA. Consequently, F holds in the state @(A, MA), which means 
that the head of (21) belongs to h(M). 
Case 4. R is obtained from the rule (12). Assume for definiteness that F is a 
fluent name not preceded by 7. R has the form 
that is, 
~(P~afterdi)+++Fafterd)+,x(Fafter&4)+. (22) 
Assume that both atoms in the body of (22) belong to h(M). Then F does not hold 
in the state Mi and holds in the state @(A, MA>. It follows that D includes an 
effect proposition P’, describing the effect of A on F whose preconditions hold in 
MA. However, the effect proposition P, from which R was generated, describes the 
effect of F on A also. Since D does not contain similar effect propositions, it 
follows that P = P’. Consequently, the preconditions of P hold in the state MA, 
and the head of (22) belongs to h(M). 
Case 5. R is obtained from the rule (13). Assume for definiteness that Pi and F 
are fluent names not preceded by 7. R has the form 
HoZds(~ P&i])++Holds(~ F&&A])+, 
Hozds(P,,[d])+ )...) Holds(P,_,,[d])+, 
Holds~P~+,,[~])+,...,Holds~P,,[dl~+, 
that is, 
~(7 Pi after A)++ ~(7 F after 2; A)+, 
dP, afterd)+,...,dP,_, after&+, (23) 
r(pi+ 1 after d)+ , . . . , 7i-(P, after A)+. 
Assume that all atoms in the body of (23) belong to h(M). Then F does not hold in 
the state WA, MA). This is only possible when at least one of the preconditions 
P ,, . . . , P, does not hold in the state MA. However, all preconditions other than Pi 
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hold in this state; consequently, Pi does not hold, which means that the head of 
(23) belongs to h(M). n 
Lemma 5. For any model M of D, 4X,,,, c X,. 
PROOF. By the definitions of 4 and 8 and Lemma 4, 
~X,\S=8an~X~\S=~n~X~\SC(h(M)US)\SCh(M)CX~. 
From this inclusion and Lemma 3, 
~X,=(~X,nS)U(~X,\S)cX,. n 
Lemma 6. Let Y be the leastfipoint of 4. For any value proposition P, if (TP)+ E 0 Y, 
then D entails P. 
PROOF. Assume that (TP)’ E OY, and take any model M of D. By the Knaster- 
Tarski theorem, Y is the least pre-fixpoint of 4; by Lemma 5, X, is a pre-fixpoint 
of 4. Consequently, Y cX,,,. By the choice of S, (G-P>’ P S. Consequently, 
(~P)+E~Y\S=[(Y\S)U(S\Y)]\S=Y\SCYCX~=~(M)U~(M). 
Since the predicate symbol in (TP)’ is Holds or Holds’, it follows that (TP>’ E 
h(M), so that P is true in M. n 
Now we are ready to prove the soundness lemma. Assume that D is consistent. 
Consider the set 2 of literals such that Z+ = 8 Y, where Y is the least lixpoint of 4. 
By Lemma 1, Z+ is an answer set of II. Case I: Z is consistent. Since Z+ is an 
answer set of the positive form of TD, we can conclude that Z is an answer set of 
TD. If TD entails TP, then z-P E Z, and consequently (TP)’ E Z+ = OY. By 
Lemma 6, it follows that D entails P. Case 2: Z is inconsistent. This means that Z 
contains a pair of complementary literals L, z. Since II does not contain 
Noninetiial’, its answer set Z+ does not contain Noninertial’ either, so that Z does 
not contain 7 Noninertial. Consequently, the predicate symbol in L and z has to 
be Holds. Then these literals can be obtained by applying rr to two complementary 
value propositions. By the choice of X, these value propositions are both entailed 
by D. This is impossible, in view of the consistency of D. 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper is the first step in the development of high-level languages designed 
specifically for representing actions. The syntax and semantics of J$ precisely 
describe the class of action domains under consideration and the intended ontology 
of action. The representation of a particular domain in H can be viewed as a 
high-level specification for the task of formalizing this domain in logic program- 
ming or another logic-based formalism. The soundness and completeness of each 
formalization become precisely stated mathematical questions. The possibilities 
and limitations of different representation methods can be compared in a precise 
fashion. For instance, in [El this approach is used to prove the equivalence of the 
methods for formalizing actions proposed earlier by Pednault 1261, Reiter [31], and 
Baker [2] for the domains representable in M. 
On the other hand, this paper is one of the first experiments (along with [17], 
1271, and [lo]) on using extended logic programs for representing knowledge. Not 
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much is known yet about mathematical properties of extended programs. For this 
reason, in this initial experiment, the source language & was deliberately made 
quite simple, and we did not try to make the translation complete. As we have 
seen, even the soundness theorem limited to this class of domains turns out to be 
nontrivial. 
The next step will be to make the translation complete and applicable to domain 
descriptions containing similar propositions. It appears that both goals can be 
achieved by using the more expressive language of disjunctive programs [12] as the 
target language for the translation. The head of a disjunctive rule is a list of literals 
separated by occurrences of the “epistemic disjunction” symbol (. For example, 
each of the rules (12) can be replaced by the more powerful disjunctive rule 
Holds(F,s)JHozds(Pj,s) cHolds(F,Result(A,s)). 
This will apparently eliminate the cases of incompleteness imilar to the counterex- 
ample from the end of Section 5. Similarly, all n rules (13) can be replaced by the 
more intuitive disjunctive rule 
Another useful extension of this work made possible by using disjunctive rules 
has to do with disjunctive information about the initial situation. In the dialect of 
ti that allows us to represent such information, a value proposition may include a 
disjunction of fluent expressions (or, more generally, an arbitrary propositional 
combination of fluent names) in place of a single fluent expression. For instance, in 
a “Russian roulette” version of the shooting example, we have two guns, described 
by two fluents, Loaded1 and Loaded2, and the initial condition can be 
initially Loaded1 V Loaded2. (24) 
In the corresponding logic program, (24) will be represented by the disjunctive rule 
Holds( Loadedl, SO) I Holds( Loaded2, SO). 
Extending the semantics of JY to this dialect is straightforward. However, 
generalizing the soundness theorem to disjunctive value propositions requires 
further work on the mathematics of disjunctive programs. 
The shooting domain with several guns is one of the cases when “first-order” 
notation would be more natural than the “propositional” notation of M. We can 
write 
initially Loaded( Gunl) V Loaded( Gun2) 
instead of (24), and express the main property of shooting by the schema 
Shoot ( X) causes 7 Alive if Loaded(x) , (25) 
where x is a metavariable for the expressions Gun1 and Gun2. Thus (25) is viewed 
as shorthand for the collection of its ground instances, which are propositions in P, 
no extension of the semantics of ~2 is needed. 
Proposition (25) can be translated into logic programming directly, by rules like 
7 HoZds( Alive, Z?esult( Shoot( x), s)) + Holds( Louded( x), s) . 
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Here x is again a “variable for guns.” Indeed, the ground instances of this rule are 
identical to the ground instances of the rules 
-J Hofds(Aliue, Result(Shoot(Gunl), s)) +- Hofds(Loaded(Gunl), s>, 
7 Holds(Alive, Result(Shoot(Gun2), $1) + HoMLoadedCGunZ), s>, 
corresponding to the two instances of (25). 
We are working on developing extensions of M capable of expressing richer 
ontologies of actions. 
The most striking limitation of M is its inability to express domain constraints. 
The fluents represented in LZ? are presumed to be independent, in the sense that 
the semantics of _Q? treats any assignment of truth values to the fluent constants as 
a valid state. 
Syntactically, constraints will be expressed by propositions of the form 
always ( formula > .
For instance, we can express that an object cannot occupy two locations at once by 
the proposition 
always 7(At(x,Z,) A&(x,&)) 
for all X, l,, I, such that I, # I,. Semantically, including constraints will require that 
a state be defined as a truth assignment o the fluent constants that makes all 
constraint formulas true. Another necessary change in the semantics is due to the 
fact that, in the presence of constraints, an action may have indirect effects. For 
instance, consider the action of moving x from 1, to I,. If the only explicitly given 
effect of this action is that it makes At(x,l,) true, we should be able to conclude 
that it also makes At(x,Z,) false (because otherwise a constraint would be 
violated). 
We plan to design and investigate dialects of M in which nondeterministic 
actions can be described. In fact, nondeterminism is closely related to the idea of 
ramifications, since the indirect effects of an action can be nondeterministic. 
Almost nothing is currently known about the frame problem in the presence of 
nondeterminism. One way to include nondeterminism is to allow effect proposi- 
tions to contain disjunctions, for instance: 
TossCoin causes Heads V Tails. 
Semantically, in either case, nondeterministic transition functions will be used. In 
the corresponding logic program, the effect of TossCoin will be expressed by a 
disjunctive rule. 
In [3], the extension of ti is introduced in which one can describe the concur- 
rent execution of actions. In this extension, performing several actions concurrently 
can be represented by using a set of action names instead of a single action name 
in a proposition, for instance: 
Alive after {Wait) { Shoot( Gunl) , Load( Gun2)}, 
and the semantics of AX? is generalized accordingly. The translation to logic 
programming presented here is extended to this “concurrent ~2” in the spirit of 
[131. 
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This inconsistency of the Stolen Car domain (Example 4) illustrates the fact that 
_YZ! cannot be used for representing “causal anomalies,” or “miracles” [21]. We plan 
to address this issue in further work, too. Our preferred approach to causal 
anomalies is to view them as evidence of unknown events that occur concurrently 
with the given actions and contribute to the properties of the new situation. 
One other dialect of &’ is described in [19]. It has symbols for temporal intervals 
over which actions may occur. 
A referee has pointed out to us that there is a simple and elegant translation 
from M into a form of abductive logic programming with integrity constraints, 
which, unlike the method of [33], handles all forms of temporal reasoning in a 
uniform way. It would be interesting to extend this translation to more expressive 
dialects of ~2 also. 
We would like to thank G. N. Kartha and Norman McCain for comments on a draft of this paper, 
Kenneth Kunen for directing us to his paper on signings, Thomas Woo for the counterexample 
reproduced in Section 5, and the referees for valuable criticisms. This research was supported in part by 
NSF grants CDA-90-15006, IRI-91-01078, and IRI-91-03112. 
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